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Reviewed by Emily Kadens
James Brundage, the Ahmanson-Murphy Distinguished Professor 
Emeritus of History and Law at the University of Kansas, has made important 
contributions to the history of medieval canon law, focusing in particular on 
laws concerning marriage, family, and sexual relations. With this book, his 
tenth, he turns to another of his specialties, the history of the legal profession. 
The work is the culmination of decades of research among the primary printed 
and archival sources and demonstrates an encyclopedic knowledge of the 
secondary literature. It goes a long way toward addressing the lack of accessible, 
English-language surveys of the history of Western legal development and as 
such will be a valuable reference for many years.
In the early 12th century, trained lawyers were a rarity in Western Europe, 
but by the mid-13th century they had not only proliferated expansively but also 
formed a recognizable professional group. Brundage’s aim is to explain how 
this metamorphosis occurred. To organize his description of the emergence 
of a legal profession he borrows from modern definitions and categories. The 
term “profession,” he explains,
applies to a line of work that is not only useful, but that also claims to 
promote the interests of the whole community as well as the individual 
worker. A profession in addition requires mastery of a substantial body of 
esoteric knowledge through a lengthy period of study and carries with it a 
high degree of social prestige. When individuals enter a profession, moreover, 
they pledge that they will observe a body of ethical rules different from and 
more demanding than those incumbent on all respectable members of the 
community in which they live (2).
This definition obviously describes modern lawyers, and, Brundage 
demonstrates, fits those of the later Middle Ages as well.
He begins his story with two chapters of background. In the first, he explains 
how the lawyers of the Roman Empire met the requirements of a profession. 
The legal experts of the Republic consisted essentially of one group of self- or 
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apprenticeship-trained jurists who dispensed legal advice largely as a public 
service, and a second group of advocates, such as Cicero, who argued in court 
but who concerned themselves more with rhetoric than with law. Later, during 
the early centuries of the Common Era, the Roman Empire witnessed the 
appearance of a body of men formally trained in law at law schools according to 
an increasingly determined curriculum and mastering an increasingly defined 
body of law. They performed work recognizable to modern lawyers, were paid 
for their labors, were required to be admitted to the bar by the judge before 
whom they wished to practice, and were held to certain ethical standards as 
regulated by magistrates.
Both here and later in the book, Brundage emphasizes the significance of 
procedural change as cause and effect of the professionalization of lawyers. As 
lawyers were called upon to resolve problems and to address issues of fairness 
and efficiency, procedure became more complex. As it did so, litigants had a 
greater need for lawyers to navigate the system for them. As lawyers became 
more indispensable, they also became more aware of their identity as a special, 
trained class. Brundage returns to this process again in his discussion of the 
12th and 13th centuries.
Though this is a minor quibble, Brundage is somewhat less discriminating 
in his use of the term “legal profession” when he speaks of the Roman world 
than he is when referring to the Middle Ages. He allows for a legal profession 
during the Late Republic (23)—a time when judges were not professionals, 
legal education was still informal, advocates who argued in court often had 
little or no legal training, a legal literature had only begun to emerge, and 
trial procedure was relatively simplistic. The same factors apply nearly equally 
to the 12th century, a period when Brundage believed that no legal profession 
yet existed. Such inconsistency, however, has little impact on the larger 
thesis because Brundage’s purpose in telling the story of the Roman lawyer 
is presumably to establish the broader, enduring characteristics of the legal 
profession in Western history.
In the second chapter, Brundage describes the early Middle Ages as a time 
without lawyers. While some law continued to exist, of course, and therefore 
while some men inevitably had greater knowledge and expertise in it than 
did others, the pillars that had supported the Roman legal profession’s edifice 
largely disappeared in Western Europe between approximately the 5th and 
the 11th centuries. The West had no law schools, no sophisticated procedure, 
no trained judges (outside of the Irish and Scottish lands), no lawyers’ 
organizations or standards of legal ethics. The Catholic Church, the inheritor 
of Roman legal and administrative institutions, continued to produce a steady 
trickle of collections of canon law texts, but on the whole, this half millennium 
was a world that did not need lawyers. Respected men of the community could 
handle matters of customary law in a simple oral procedure using such “truth”-
finding techniques as the ordeal and oaths, and governmental administrative 
machinery was rudimentary at best.
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This long period without lawyers is precisely what makes the next stage 
in Western legal history so dynamic and exciting. The sudden reappearance 
of the trained lawyer between the end of the 11th and the middle of the 12th 
centuries is one of the most stunning, and most difficult to explain, phenomena 
of Western history. Brundage refers to three factors that played a role in this 
development. First, he mentions the rediscovery of Justinian’s Digest, the most 
intellectually sophisticated part of the codification of Roman law, produced 
in mid-6th-century Byzantium on the order of the Emperor Justinian. Second, 
he points out the separation of canon law from theology and the former’s 
establishment as a legal discipline. This process was significantly aided by the 
appearance around 1140 of the Decretum of Gratian, an innovative textbook 
designed to teach canon law. With the Digest and the Decretum around which to 
organize instruction, identifiable schools began to form, first in Bologna and 
later elsewhere in Italy, France, and England, to teach students the law in a 
formal, if not at first rigidly-structured, fashion.
Law schools created lawyers, and the resulting proliferation of legally-
trained men across Europe changed the course of Western history. Brundage 
spends the bulk of the book discussing this development during the period 
between the mid-12th and mid-13th centuries, but the outlines of the story can be 
briefly summarized. By the late 11th century, Western Europe was in the midst 
of a dramatic socio-economic upheaval. Population was increasing for the first 
time in about half a millennium. Some of that excess population moved to 
cities as improved agricultural techniques created a surplus that could feed 
town dwellers. With the growth of cities came the growth of commerce, as 
merchants traded ever longer distances to supply the desires of the growing 
number of people with money to spend.
A more sophisticated and complex urban society required a more 
sophisticated and complex law than the existing Germanic customs that had 
for centuries governed the small, stable rural villages. Such a law appeared 
in the form of the rediscovered Digest of Justinian. In keeping with the spirit 
of intellectual inquiry that characterized the so-called Twelfth Century 
Renaissance, a few masters in Bologna began to study and then teach the 
Roman law. This in turn influenced the development and teaching of the canon 
law, which soon got its own textbook in Gratian’s Decretum. By the second half 
of the 12th century, the study of both civil and canon law was established in 
Northern Italy, Southern France, Paris, and Oxford, as students came to learn 
under famous masters. By the first third of the 13th century, these centers of 
study had coalesced into degree-granting universities.
In a society peopled by merchants, artisans, peasants, and soldiers, educated 
men were an anomaly. At first, most of them joined the administrative ranks of 
the Catholic Church, which was in the midst of a period of great reform and 
growth. Some entered the service of secular princes, who were beginning to 
consolidate their power and form administrative and judicial bureaucracies. 
Eventually even cities came routinely to hire professional clerks and judges. 
A large percentage of these educated men had obtained some legal training, 
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and as all lawyers know, training in the law changes how one thinks. Many 
new lawyers may have returned to practice in customary-law courts, but 
they brought with them the vocabulary, legal categories, and legal analysis 
of the Roman law. More lawyers bringing their esoteric learning with them 
into courts and into the councils of kings, princes, popes, and bishops began 
a snowballing process of legalization. The law, in the form of Roman and 
canon law, became a widely-agreed vocabulary of courts, administration, and 
diplomacy, especially (at first) in the Church. Bishops needed not only an 
increasing knowledge of law to govern their flocks but also a growing entourage 
of professional lawyers to act as judges to deal with the rising tide of litigation 
engulfing the Church courts. Already by the 1150s, a significant proportion of 
the College of Cardinals had some legal training, and the number of lawyers 
among cardinals and bishops would soon outpace the number of theologians. 
By the second quarter of the 12th century, the ever-growing docket of 
ecclesiastical courts motivated Church authorities to search for an improved 
procedure. Around 1140, Pope Innocent II’s chancellor, Cardinal Haimeric, 
asked the leading civil law master at Bologna, Bulgarus, to prepare a guide 
to civil procedure. Naturally, Bulgarus looked to Roman law as his guide. By 
the end of the century, the Church courts were employing a hybrid Roman-
medieval process that came to be known as Romano-canonical procedure 
and that forms the foundation of modern civil law procedure. The more 
established and the more complicated Romano-canonical procedure became, 
the more necessary and entrenched lawyers became. As Brundage explained, 
“[b]y 1200, only a foolhardy litigant would choose to initiate a lawsuit or to 
defend himself against an accusation before a canonical court without some 
help and guidance from a person who had either formal training in the learned 
laws or considerable practical experience in the courts” (151–52). As more 
litigants delegated the task of pursuing their suit to lawyers, the judges, too, 
needed legal training. The more legal training the officers of the court had, the 
more they expected that law to be applied in court. As a consequence, over 
the course of the 12th to 14th centuries, ecclesiastical and then secular courts 
evolved toward an increasingly formalized procedure and the increasing 
indispensability of lawyers.
The growing prominence of lawyers in 13th-century society had two echo 
effects. As lawyers took over the role of court advocates and legal advisors, 
they also gained a sense of their own corporate identity. For the first time since 
the fall of the Roman Empire, late 12th- and early 13th-century lawyers began to 
be required to obtain admission to practice before courts; they had to swear 
oaths, called calumny oaths, to use good practices; they had to join professional 
organizations; and they had to adhere to a set of ethical rules. These final steps, 
added to the law schools, the new procedure, and the increasing dominance 
of university-trained men among advocates and judges, combined to make 
lawyers the first recognizable profession in medieval Europe.
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The second echo effect of lawyerization was less romantic but probably 
inexorable. With lawyers came lawyer jokes. That is, the more important 
lawyers became in society, the more control they had over the dispensing of 
justice, the more power they had in government, and the more economically 
successful they became, the more other people resented them. Then as now, 
the services of lawyers were not inexpensive and litigation was not expeditious, 
and the litigants at the mercy of their attorneys complained bitterly about the 
sale of justice.
Brundage’s treatment of legal ethics and of the dislike of lawyers 
demonstrates two of the most interesting lessons of the book for modern 
readers. The ethical dilemmas and criticism attorneys face today are nearly 
identical to those faced by Roman and medieval lawyers. The very nature of 
the lawyer’s job—representing clients who may or may not be in the right and 
taking a fee for helping people get their day in court—creates what appears 
to be universal and perhaps inevitable conflicts. Such modern problems as 
over-crowded dockets, lawyers engaging in procedural delay tactics, excessive 
appeals, and poor people needing to be provided with legal representation 
free of charge also plagued the Roman and medieval legal systems. This, in 
turn, suggests that for all the hand-wringing that occurs today over high fees, 
the inaccessibility of the legal system to people of modest means, long waits 
for trials, and ethical lapses, some problems are inherent in our legal system. If 
we choose to continue to bemoan them, then we might be well advised to learn 
from our predecessors about the supposed solutions that did not work rather 
than continue along the same well-worn but ineffective path.
The second lesson Brundage’s book offers lawyers today is that, despite 
the fact that everywhere lawyers become integral they encounter sometimes 
virulent criticism and dislike, they have played an extremely important role 
in the development of Western society. Beginning in the 12th century and 
continuing unabated to today, lawyers have come to the fore in administration, 
justice, and diplomacy because their training has given them a unique set of 
skills that other members of society have not had. Knowledge of the law and 
the ability to apply it to solving problems have meant that lawyers have simply 
been better than most other educated men at running governments, both 
lay and ecclesiastical, and resolving disputes, whether through negotiation, 
arbitration, or litigation.
The book, masterful though it is, is not without its weaknesses. Brundage’s 
decision to use a modern definition of profession seems somewhat arbitrary 
and anachronistic for the transition period of the late 12th century. After 
completing a discussion of the increasing number and prominence of lawyers, 
the growing sophistication of procedure, the lawyers’ fee structure, the chorus 
of criticism of legalization, and the spread of law schools, he then claims that 
the legal profession did not exist yet. Apparently, until the legal community 
could tick off the entire—modern—list of characteristics, especially admission 
to a professional body, it could not be called a profession. Obviously Brundage 
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needed some sort of framework around which to organize his story, but the 
framework ought not to impose a rigidity that the evidence may not warrant.
The other criticisms stem from the organization and limits of the book. 
Brundage chose to explain the history chronologically, but this resulted in a 
certain amount of repetition. He sometimes uses identical examples to make 
the same point for different periods, and discussions of issues such as fees, 
the structure of the legal community, and professional etiquette occur two 
or three times in the body of the book, though often with differing levels of 
detail. The advantage of this approach, however, is that the book can be used 
for reference, with each chapter being a self-contained unit. Unfortunately, 
too, Brundage deals almost exclusively with canon law courts and lawyers. He 
discusses the civil law most thoroughly in his chapter on the universities, but 
his treatment of secular courts is limited, and he almost completely ignores the 
English legal system. His reason for this gap is his belief, expressed briefly in 
the Introduction, that church courts led the way in creating a legal profession 
(3). It is true that the English were comparative laggards in this regard, but his 
evidence about bar admissions, the use of trained judges, and the creation of 
professional organizations seems to suggest that a few secular courts reached 
these milestones slightly before or simultaneous with the ecclesiastical courts. 
The absence of much discussion on England is rather disappointing, for the 
English experience would have made a fascinating counterpoint. The legal 
profession developed there along a quite different path and yet reached most 
of the same ends. However, Brundage may have felt that the book was long 
enough and that sufficient other literature existed in English covering that 
history.
The final criticism takes the opposite position. Rather than decrying that 
the author did too little, it asserts that he did too much. A more accurate title 
for the book might have been “The Medieval Origins of the Legal System.” 
Brundage treats the reader to detailed and useful descriptions of such matters 
as medieval procedure, the recusal of judges, the fee structure and attire of 
lawyers. All of this is wonderful and rich, but the profusion of information and 
the detours along paths that relate only slightly to the main thesis occasionally 
threaten to obscure the thread of the story about lawyers becoming a profession. 
Finally, in light of Brundage’s important contribution to the small library 
of survey books in English on Western legal history, I will end with a plea. 
Brundage has written, quite intentionally, an essentially institutional history. 
He informs his reader about the steps in the procedure or the structure of 
the law school curriculum, but neither he nor anyone else has written a book 
that tells the story of what the lawyers and judges of the past did. We have no 
books that translate and discuss the legal texts—such as the university summae, 
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the opinions of counsel (consilia), the notarial contracts, the courtroom briefs, 
or the judicial decisions—that constituted the day-to-day creation of the law. 
We have nothing yet to teach modern, non-historian readers how the thinking 
and working of lawyers and judges, especially in continental Europe, evolved 
over time. Now that, thanks to Brundage, we know who the lawyers were and 
how the legalization of the West occurred, we need an equally weighty study 
of how all those lawyers and judges used all that law.
